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Abstract—Spectrum Sharing and Wireless Network Vir-
tualization have been explored as methods to achieve
spectrum efficiency, increase network capacity and, overall,
to address the existing spectrum scarcity problems. This
work aims at exploring the link between these two topics,
by specifically placing virtualization as a technology that
can render spectrum sharing schemes feasible.
No complete analysis can be made without taking into
account three important axes: technology, policy and eco-
nomics. In this light, in order to explore how virtualization
enables spectrum sharing, flexibility is studied as a common
attribute, due to the characteristics it presents regarding
the three preceding axes.
By determining how spectrum sharing, wireless virtu-
alization and flexibility tie together, ground can be laid
toward exploring further opportunities that would enhance
spectrum usage, making it possible for this resource to
foster these days’ ever-increasing demand.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lack of flexibility for spectrum use derived from
rigid regulatory schemes resulted in high spectrum in-
efficiencies and in the scarcity of spectrum that we
experience nowadays. The remarkable amount of past
and present research efforts support the importance of
this problem and have given as result significant and in-
novative advances towards solving the spectrum shortage
issues and their consequences.
Spectrum sharing is not a new topic. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has made its efforts
towards granting users with more flexibility on the use
of spectrum, which rendered sharing of this resource fea-
sible more than ten years ago [1]–[4]. Throughout these
years, technologies have emerged, which have turned
sharing into a realizable approach. In fact, with the
advent of new technological mechanisms, new sharing
arrangements arise, which have actually become more or
less appealing depending on the underlying policy and
economic requirements.
In this light, the focus of this work is on how wire-
less network virtualization, a relatively new technology,
becomes an enabler for spectrum sharing. The analysis
presented contemplates technical, economic and some
policy perspectives, as these represent fundamental axes
in the innovation of Telecommunications. The actual link
between sharing and virtualization could be approached
from myriad standpoints; nevertheless, in this work, this
link has been addressed from a flexibility perspective.
This attribute has been chosen because it represents a
key characteristic for sharing to take place, which can
be obtained through technologies such as virtualization.
Additionally, flexibility permits us to explore the impli-
cations of the three aforementioned axes in the adoption
of sharing schemes.
This work is structured as follows: section II presents
an overview and taxonomy of spectrum sharing. Def-
initions, aspects and perspectives relevant to Wireless
Network Virtualization are included in section III. Flex-
ibility, in section IV, represents the meeting point be-
tween the two concepts, as this section aims at merging
the flexibility needs of spectrum sharing with the flexi-
bility that can be obtained from wireless virtualization.
Additionally, policy perspectives, economic implications
and the concerns regarding the incentives for establishing
sharing schemes are covered in this section. The con-
cluding remarks and future challenges are presented in
section V.
II. SPECTRUM SHARING
The traditional, rigid, model of spectrum licensing
focused on preventing harmful interference but it resulted
in high spectral inefficiencies [5]. It is in this way that
increasing the opportunities for spectrum sharing can be
key toward alleviating spectrum scarcity. Nevertheless,
before delving into specifics of spectrum sharing, it is
important to recall that there are rights associated with
spectrum, which drive different configurations for the use
of this resource.
A. Rights-based Spectrum Usage Models
In order to establish a sharing scheme, first of all, it is
essential to clarify which are the underlying rights asso-
ciated with spectrum. As DeVany states in [6], “different
configurations of rights and duties will differently affect
an individual’s cost-reward calculus, providing him with
varying incentives for different resource uses.” In light
of this, three spectrum usage models can be presented
(1) “Command-and-control” model, (2) “Exclusive-use”
model and (3) “Commons” or “Open Access” model [2],
[7], [8].
Command-and-control model: It was the traditional
process of managing spectrum in the United States.
By 2002, it was utilized for most spectrum within the
FCC’s jurisdiction and it comprised specific regulatory
requirements, such as service restrictions, power limits,
build-out requirements, among others, for the use of a
given frequency band [2], [7].
Exclusive-use model: In this licensing model, the
licensee has exclusive and transferable rights to the use
of a specific spectrum band within a defined geographic
area. The licensee is granted flexible use rights, which
permit the primary users to utilize their spectrum for
applications that have not been specified in the original
license [9]; however, there are still technical require-
ments to ensure user’s protection from interference. It
should be noted that this model does not imply the
creation of “full” property rights in spectrum.
Commons or Open Access model: In this model, an
unlimited number of unlicensed (licensed-by-rule) users
are allowed to share a given frequency. The usage
rights are primarily governed by technical standards or
etiquettes; however, users are not entitled to protection
from interference [2], [7]. In this case, spectrum can be
regarded as a “public” resource that should be equally
and fairly accessible to all users without excessive reg-
ulation [8].
As it can be observed, the command and control model
imposes far more regulatory constraints than the two
other cases, thus limiting the flexibility of use of the
spectrum resource. One of the main recommendations of
the Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) in its November
2002 report [2] was that the FCC should balance the
three spectrum rights models in order to establish new
regulation and thus include more flexible spectrum use
opportunities for the users. Additional recommendations
from the SPTF included that it might prove beneficial to
adapt particular properties from more than one model to
different frequency bands in order to exploit the benefits
inherent to these changes. It was envisioned that if these
models were consistently applied to the spectrum as a
whole, there would be high potential to significantly
reduce the artificial scarcity of spectrum that currently
exists due to access barriers, in addition to reducing the
cost of obtaining exclusive spectrum rights in the market
as well as alleviating the congestion existent in the
spectrum used on a commons basis [2], [7]. To elaborate
on the above, there are two important factors that need
to be considered in order to determine which model to
choose: spectrum scarcity and transaction costs. The first
refers to the degree in which spectrum demand exceeds
the current supply due to the competing demands for use,
while the second stems from the time and resources that
a given user needs to spend in order to obtain spectrum
access rights from one or many parties. It is thus that, in
general lines, the following recommendations have been
given for the application of each of the models [2], [7]:
• Command-and-control regulation should be mini-
mized, being reserved only for those uses that yield
clear, non-market public interest benefits and that
require explicit regulatory guidelines in order to
avoid market failure.
• The exclusive use model should be applied to the
majority of spectrum, especially in those bands
where scarcity is high and the transaction costs
for establishing a market-based mechanism for the
negotiation of spectrum access rights are relatively
low.
• The commons model should be applied to those
bands where scarcity is low and the transaction
costs associated with negotiation and market mech-
anisms are high.
As it can be expected, the application of these spec-
trum usage models, or parts thereof, in specific spectrum
bands calls for a rearrangement or emergence of new
rights, which, as Demsetz states (in the context of
property rights), “takes place in response to the desires
of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-
cost possibilities.” [10]. Along these lines, it is evident
that with new rights, there is also the possibility for
new spectrum usage models, namely, spectrum sharing
scenarios.
B. Taxonomy of Spectrum Sharing
Spectrum sharing can be classified in myriad ways,
depending on the considered criteria, fact that is largely
reflected in the literature. In this work, I would like
to present a taxonomy of spectrum sharing based on
spectrum rights and taking into account the interaction
of spectrum users and who sets the rules for sharing.
We shall remember that, as previously presented, shar-
ing has its underlying basis on the rights that different
users have, and are thus willing to share with others.
In light of this, three types of spectrum sharing based
on rights can be presented: (1) Property Rights Model,
(2) Sharing among equals and (3) Primary-Secondary
Sharing.
According to the interaction of the spectrum users,
spectrum-sharing environments can be based on coop-
eration or coexistence [5]:
• Cooperation: Devices must communicate and coop-
erate with each other, even if they belong to differ-
ent systems and administrative control, in order to
avoid interference. A common protocol needs to be
supported by all devices (and all systems) operating
in the band.
• Coexistence: There is no explicit signaling among
devices in the band. For instance, devices might
sense the presence of others for interference avoid-
ance purposes.
Regarding who sets the rules for spectrum sharing,
given that we are dealing with users holding different
degrees of spectrum rights, the sharing-rules can be
set by the regulator, as it has traditionally happened,
or they can be set by a licensee entitled to sufficient
spectrum rights as to share this resource with other users.
Furthermore,
• The regulator has the ability to influence all spec-
trum, instead of only a, perhaps small, frequency
band.
• The licensee may charge a fee for granting access
and managing the spectrum. Such a fee could
be a one-time payment or a usage-based charge.
Situations may arise in which the licensee is a
manufacturer who will allow access to his spectrum
only to its own devices, thus ensuring a certain level
of technical homogeneity.
The main difference between the regulator and the
licensee lies on their objectives for setting the spectrum-
sharing rules. The goal of the regulator is to find so-
lutions that will best suit the public interest, while a
license-holder will, most likely, be interested in maxi-
mizing its own profits [5].
Characteristics and examples of each of these scenarios
are presented in what follows.
Property Rights Model: Property rights can be de-
fined as “the ability to buy; hold; use; sell; dispose of, in
whole or in part; or otherwise determine the status of an
identifiable, separable and discrete object, right or privi-
lege.” [11]. According to Coase and Hazlett, the creation
and enforcement of property rights would be necessary
and sufficient factors for economic development [12].
As a matter of fact, this mechanism can lead the way to
crystallizing the idea proposed by Ronald Coase some
fifty years ago [13], by which he established that through
a clear definition of property rights, scarce resources
can be assigned via pricing mechanisms without the
need of government (or regulator) intervention. Indeed,
“Coase’s theorem” states that when property rights are
well defined and transferable, in the absence of transac-
tion costs, every government allocation of property rights
will be equally efficient This is the result of all parties
privately bargaining to correct any externalities [14],
[15]. In this way, the property rights model contemplates
a market-driven approach, in which spectrum resources
are assigned via market forces to users who value it the
most.
According to DeVany, in order to create a property
rights system, which will lead the way for the operation
of a market system, it is necessary to consider three key
elements (1) a valuable and unambiguous definition of
rights that are compatible with the physical character-
istics of spectrum (2) an enforcement mechanism for
these rights; and (3) provide the means for the initial
distribution of the spectrum-use rights to the public [6].
Additionally, an important emphasis on the flexibility of
property rights is made. For instance, in [16], it is stated
that property rights should be flexible enough and they
should be even given in perpetuity. This would make
it possible for spectrum to be traded, aggregated and
disaggregated. In terms of the distribution of rights to the
public, this model envisions that the pricing-mechanism
could be employed for the allocation and assignment of
the entire spectrum. Proposals along these lines include
the transition approach presented in [17], which consid-
ers necessary a “large-scale, two-sided ‘band restructur-
ing’ auction of spectrum” (also known as “big-bang”
auction), which includes spectrum voluntarily offered
by licensees and unassigned spectrum. However, the
authors also consider necessary not only to accurately
define property rights, but also to provide the incumbents
with the appropriate incentives to participate in this
auction. This represents quite an idealistic approach
given the challenges inherent to its realization. Probably
we will see a small-scale example of this model once
the incentive auction that the FCC has envisioned for
the Broadcast Television Spectrum [18] takes place.1
An additional option comprises the adoption of sec-
ondary markets for spectrum. Secondary markets are
those markets in which the seller of a good is not who
sold the good for the first time. It should be noted that
‘secondary’ refers to the trading subsequent to the initial
allocation of rights by the regulator, it does not have
the same connotation as ‘secondary use’, given that the
users who obtain spectrum in a secondary market may
be granted primary, or exclusive rights to the use of
spectrum [19]. Through a well-functioning secondary
market, as demand and supply shift, spectrum is expected
to shift to more efficient uses, perhaps by parties out-
side of the initial spectrum allocation [20]. In order to
support the benefits derived from secondary markets for
spectrum, Professor Cramton’s statement can be quoted:
“secondary markets are essential for the efficient and
intensive use of spectrum. Secondary markets identify
gains from trade that are unrealized by the primary
market which in this case is the FCC spectrum auctions.”
[21].
1According to the latest update posted on October 2014, the FCC
anticipates that applications for the auction will be received in the Fall
2015 and that the auction will start in early 2016. Information available
online: http://www.fcc.gov/blog/incentive-auction-progress-report. Last
accessed on January 9, 2015.
Secondary markets arrangements have already been an-
alyzed and approved by the FCC [3]. Current regulation
allows two different configurations, in terms of trans-
ferred rights: Spectrum Manager and De facto transfer
lease. In the first case, the initial licensee negotiates
access to the spectrum with a given user (now lessee),
but retains the de jure2 and de facto3 rights over the
spectrum i.e., it retains the legal rights over the spectrum
license and remains accountable to the FCC with regards
to the spectrum usage and interference caused to other
users. In the de facto transfer lease, the licensee grants
the lessee with de facto rights over the spectrum. In this
manner, the lessee will be held liable for the usage of
the spectrum and thus accountable to the FCC. However,
the initial licensee will still hold the de jure rights over
the spectrum.
Given that the entire spectrum is envisioned to be
allocated and assigned via market forces, there is not
an explicit notion of coexistence or cooperation. Users
will be able to establish the spectrum usage and sharing
they find more profitable according to their property
rights and they will be able to negotiate in order to
achieve optimality. Regarding who sets the rules, since
this model is based on property rights, spectrum users or
property rights’ holders will be in charge of determining
the sharing conditions with little or no intervention from
the regulator.
Sharing among equals: In this environment, all de-
vices have equal rights. There is more flexibility in terms
of the behavior among peers; however, the key factor in
this type of environment is whether all devices have the
incentive to limit the interference they cause to those they
share the spectrum with. In fact, different users under this
arrangement need to coordinate with each other in the
shared bands.
Sharing among equals may refer to sharing among equal
primary devices, sharing among equal secondary devices
or even sharing among equal regional infrastructures [5],
[19].
Coexistence: No device is given a clear priority. Most
of these arrangements are the result of taking advantage
of the deployment of unlicensed bands. It is important to
note that devices in this type of scenario should not have
stringent quality of service requirements. Additionally,
as previously mentioned, it is not only necessary to
have technical capabilities for interference avoidance;
devices should also have the incentives to avoid a greedy
behavior, which may actually lead to a tragedy of the
2“By right; based on laws or actions of the state.” Definition obtained
from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/de%20jure
3“Exercising power as if legally constituted; resulting from
economic or social factors rather than from laws or ac-
tions of the state.” Definition obtained from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/de+facto?show=0&t=1421624333
commons [22]. In such a situation, the (mis)behavior
of devices leads to an overconsumption of the shared
resource resulting in low-quality performance for all
devices in the band.
Spectrum commons is a clear example of this type of
sharing. It can be set up by the regulator, such as the case
of unlicensed bands where devices coexist e.g., WiFi and
cordless phones. Commons can also be established by
a primary user as is the case of private commons. In
such a configuration, the primary user specifies a set of
technical parameters for operation in the band he has pre-
viously been granted a license for, and authorizes users
of devices operating under those parameters to access
it. The general restrictions and technical requirements
that accompany the original license also apply for the
users of the private commons, and thus may shape the
requirements established by the primary user. Regulation
dictates that devices operating in this environment should
utilize peer-to-peer technologies [4].
Cooperation: All devices should actively communi-
cate and cooperate without regard to their owner or
proprietary system. In this type of scenarios, we may
find devices negotiating with each other in order to avoid
collision. There are important benefits derived from
cooperation. For instance, cooperative gain could be
exploited, which refers to the gain that can be obtained
from network architectures in terms of communications
efficiency on a system basis. This gain is the result of co-
operative strategies that various terminals and elements
carry out in a networked system [23]. Additionally,
a cooperative approach could represent cost-effective
solutions to provide coverage to large regions where
other options (e.g., Wi-Fi based micro cellular systems)
are not economically feasible [5].
When the rules are set by the regulator, we can find
cooperation within unlicensed bands in wireless local
area networks as well as cooperative mesh networks
where the regulator sets the etiquette. When the licensee
sets the rules, he might set the corresponding etiquette
for the deployment of cooperative mesh networks.
Depending on the underlying agreement, we could
find examples of cooperation in the deployment of virtual
networks. In this particular case the rules may be set by
the regulator or by the licensee.
Primary-Secondary Sharing: It is important to first
provide a definition of primary and secondary users.
A primary rights holder, or primary user, is the entity
that holds spectrum access rights that are protected from
interference. Normally, this user is the one who obtained
the license from the regulator in the first place, and it
can also be referred as licensee. Secondary users are
those entities that can access a spectrum band, but they
need to avoid causing harmful interference to the primary
users of that band. There can be various secondary users
contending for access to a band [19].
Coexistence: Secondary users do not require permis-
sion from the primary user in order to access the band.
The regulator may determine specific bands that need to
be shared by existing primary users and dictate the shar-
ing etiquette. Examples of these cases include Federal-
Commercial sharing, where the primary users are Federal
users such as DoD radars and meteorological satellites,
and the secondary users may be different entities who
can utilize the spectrum not in use by the primary,
outside of predefined exclusion zones and as long as
they do not cause interference to the primary user. A
second example is spectrum sharing in TV Whitespaces,
where the primary users are TV Broadcasters and the
secondary users are unlicensed devices who can operate
as long as they have geolocation capabilities (except for
the case of mobile devices operating in client mode), and
evidently, they do not cause harmful interference to the
primary user.
When it is the primary user who sets the rules, secondary
users can access the spectrum through spectrum overlay
or underlay mechanisms. In this manner, secondary users
can access the spectrum without requiring permission
from the primary at every instance.
It is important to note that Cognitive Radios is a
useful technology for the deployment of coexistence
environments [5].
Cooperation: Secondary users can access a spectrum
band only when the primary user grants them permission
to do so. In this scenario, the secondary user may (or may
not) pay a fee for spectrum access. Due to the explicit
coordination with the primary user, this model is useful
for guaranteed QoS and infrequent spectrum use.
The regulator can mandate cooperation between pri-
mary and secondary users in order to achieve more
efficient utilization of a specific band. Authorized Shared
Access (ASA) and Licensed Shared Access (LSA) con-
stitute an example of this type of scenario. ASA/LSA
will allow a secondary user to have exclusive-use of the
spectrum when the primary user is not using it. This type
of arrangement is suitable for spectrum that is currently
used by non-mobile incumbents, that presents low and/or
localized utilization and which is hard to re purpose
within a reasonable time frame. Under ASA/LSA the
primary user can determine what, when and where to
share the spectrum and it also gives the secondary users
higher QoS guarantees. In fact, in order to achieve an
efficient agreement, the licensee, the secondary user and
the regulator participate in the negotiation [24]–[26].
Real-time secondary markets are an example of a
primary-secondary sharing environment based on co-
operation where the primary user will set the rules.
In such an arrangement, any licensee may consider
making his spectrum available to other uses, regardless
of the use he actually gives to the spectrum [27]. In
this manner, secondary users are able to individually
negotiate spectrum access rights, i.e., lease spectrum, for
short periods of time (in the order of hours, minutes
or even fractions of seconds) from the primary user in
exchange of a fee. The relationship of primary-secondary
is maintained, given that the rights are transferred only
for the duration of the spectrum lease, which in this case
can be significantly short.
Figure 1 summarizes the taxonomy of spectrum shar-
ing presented in this section.
C. Enabling Spectrum Sharing
Various spectrum sharing arrangements were pre-
sented in the previous subsection; however, we shall
remember that the underlying resource, spectrum, is not
unidimensional nor it is perfectly fungible. In truth,
different authors have pointed out several levels and
dimensions in which spectrum can vary [6], [28] and
studies have also been performed on the impact of spec-
trum’s fungibility limitations [29], [30]. These factors
evidently have restricted the opportunities for spectrum
sharing.
Taking into account the preceding shortcomings,
throughout the years, different technologies and mech-
anisms have been devised for enabling spectrum shar-
ing. For example, we can point out multiple-access
techniques, spread spectrum mechanisms, super-cell and
mini/micro cell deployments, cellular reuse, spectrum
reuse through directional antennas, the development of
software-defined and cognitive radios, among others.
Nevertheless, the sharing experience could be definitely
enhanced if we were to use an “enabler” that could
permit to bypass (at least) some of these shortcomings.
Overcoming these substantial physical barriers inherent
to the nature of electromagnetic spectrum could defi-
nitely increase the opportunities for alleviating spectrum
scarcity. In the next section, I would like to explore
the features of wireless network virtualization that could
convert this technology in an enhanced spectrum sharing
enabler.
III. WIRELESS NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION
Wireless network virtualization is a topic that is cur-
rently under exhaustive study. It is quite difficult to
present a unique definition of wireless network virtual-
ization as it has been shaped and adapted to different
research works and contexts. Nevertheless, I consider
it important to first lay out some general concepts
and characteristics in order to determine the scope of
Wireless Network Virtualization that is being applied to
this work.
Fig. 1. Spectrum Sharing Taxonomy
A. General Definitions
In a broad sense, virtualization refers to the creation
of a virtual version of something instead of the actual
“thing” itself [31]. Nevertheless, it is important to point
out the definition of virtualization from a Computer
Science perspective, given that we owe the initial no-
tions of virtualization to this field. An interesting and
comprehensive concept in that context is presented in
[32], which states that “Network virtualization is any
form of partitioning or combining a set of network
resources, and presenting (abstracting) it to users such
that each user, through its set of partitioned or combined
resources has a unique, separate view of the network.
Resources can be fundamental (nodes, links) or de-
rived (topologies), and can be virtualized recursively.
Node and link virtualization involve resource parti-
tion/combination/abstraction; and topology virtualization
involves new address spaces.” From these concepts,
we can expect that, through virtualization, the diverse
components of the network are partitioned, combined,
sliced and abstracted in order to create virtual instances
of the network. When these components are wireless
network assets, then we can talk about wireless network
virtualization. Through this approach, we can further ex-
pect that different types of partitions, combinations and
abstractions will yield distinct types of virtual networks;
furthermore, the abstraction of each part of the network
will represent a particular perspective, resulting in the
notion of dealing with a new network, different from
the original [32]. Note that, each virtual network created
should have the ability to operate without (necessarily)
being aware of the underlying virtualization process. We
shall not forget; however, that there must be a certain
degree of isolation between the virtualized instances of
the network and their users that could permit individual
virtual networks to contain operator-specific protocols
and architectures. These protocols can actually differ
entirely from one co-existing virtual network to another
[33], [34].
Wireless network virtualization is expected to provide
significant means to overcome the spectrum scarcity that
we have been experiencing. In fact, this mechanism is
aimed at providing opportunities for spectrum access
to a greater number of users, through the creation of
increased alternatives regarding the use, sharing and
assignment of the existing resources [35]. An additional,
important benefit derived from virtualization is the flex-
ibility it adds to the network. It gives operators the
capabilities they require in order to make changes to the
network (e.g., expand it or shrink it) according to their
needs while significantly reducing costs that would be
otherwise prohibitive [34].
B. Aspects and Perspectives of Wireless Virtualization
Delving deeper into virtualization, according to [33],
there are three important aspects of wireless virtualiza-
tion: (1) depth and scope of virtualization, (2) virtual-
ization of different wireless technologies and (3) virtual-
ization of client-side or infrastructure-side technologies.
Regarding the scope, virtualization can be applied
network-wide or in a localized manner. The first type
of virtualization refers to high-level perspectives which
focus on the management of the wireless network, de-
veloping design guidelines and abstraction interfaces that
integrate the existing wireless resources into a virtualized
network infrastructure. The localized scope implies low-
level perspectives that normally explore the virtualiza-
tion of resources pertaining to individual nodes in the
network.
When talking about virtualization depth, reference is
made to the extent of penetration of the slicing4 and
partitioning mechanisms on the wireless resources. In
fact, with deeper virtualization, the entire protocol stack
can be eventually virtualized. The depth is particularly
tied to the granularity of the virtualized resources and it
will also dictate where the virtualization managing entity
and resource allocator (e.g., hypervisor) will be located
within the virtualization architecture.
Wireless network virtualization can be applied to a
wide variety of access technologies; for instance, we
could point out (1) very short range wireless devices
4“Slicing of resources refers to the process of assigning a particular
resource to be part of a network slice.” Slicing does not necessarily
imply resource virtualization and sharing (i.e., an entire base station
could be assigned to a slice without actual virtualization of the base
station). For a resource (or a slice) to be virtualized, it is required that
multiple users or slices share the same physical resource [33].
(e.g., Bluetooth, Zigbee, Personal Area Networks and
sensor networks), (2) Short range devices (e.g., IEEE
802.11 based WLANs) and (3) medium and long range
devices (e.g., WiMAX, LTE and other WMAN technolo-
gies) [33].
The infrastructure-side as well as the client-side of
the network can be considered for virtualization, and a
step further constitutes the integration of virtualization
on both sides of the network. The choice of the type of
virtualization depends on the scope and on the type of
applications that the virtualized network will serve for.
For instance, from the infrastructure perspective, the re-
sources for the downlink and/or uplink communications
can be virtualized. From the client-side perspective, vir-
tualization can be employed to satisfy lossless handover,
advanced mobility management and to optimize the
uplink allocation, among other objectives. Nevertheless,
there are some network configurations such as mesh net-
works, machine-to-machine configurations and ad-hoc
networks where the distinction between infrastructure-
side and client-side is not clear. In some of these cases,
one wireless node may perform functionalities of a
basestation and a client.
Exploring further where virtualization can be applied,
three different perspectives of wireless virtualization can
be pointed out [33]: (1) flow-based; (2) protocol-based
and (3) spectrum-based virtualization These perspectives
are relevant to the type of resources being virtualized and
the depth of slicing.
Flow-based wireless virtualization mainly focuses on
providing mechanisms for the isolation, scheduling, ser-
vice differentiation and management for uplink and
downlink traffic flows that belong to different slices. Vir-
tualization of the MAC scheduler can also be considered
through this method, resulting in enhanced QoS guaran-
tees for each slice. If only this type of virtualization is
implemented, all the virtual slices will share the same
protocol stack. Examples of research works performed
along this lines include OpenFlow [36] (flow-based
SDN-enabling technology), OpenRoads (or OpenFlow
Wireless) and vBTS5 [37].
Protocol-based wireless virtualization focuses on “the
isolation, customization and management of multiple
wireless protocol instances on the same radio hardware”
[33]. Varying degrees of protocol-based virtualization
are feasible, namely partial and full implementation.
In the partial implementation, multiple instances of the
same protocol stack can share the radio resources while
5Virtual Base Transceiver system for WiMAX. This framework
focuses on the implementation of virtualization of base stations’ radio
resources in order to achieve isolation between multiple virtual net-
works. The authors have presented results from their virtual basestation
prototype which demonstrate enhanced mobile network performance,
isolation across slices belonging to different flow types and capabilities
for the customization of flow scheduling.
utilizing dissimilar configurations. In the full implemen-
tation, different protocol stacks can operate on the same
radio front-end through the decoupling of the wireless
protocols from the physical hardware. One option to
achieve this is through Software-Defined Radio (SDR)
technologies.
Spectrum and radio frequency front-end virtualization
are the deepest types of slicing that are currently being
studied. This perspective of virtualization implies the
abstraction and dynamic allocation of spectrum bands
to each user via spectrum reshaping and radio slicing
techniques. In this perspective, the RF front-end is
entirely decoupled from the protocols, making it possible
for various virtual wireless nodes to use a single front-
end or vice versa This approach can be implemented
via Cognitive Radio and Dynamic Spectrum Access
techniques
The aforementioned perspectives are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, they can be combined to yield deeper
levels of virtualization and reach larger scopes, which
could possibly lead to the deployment of fully virtualized
wireless infrastructures. In turn, this represents further
flexibility, isolation and granularity of control over the
wireless infrastructure [33]. Figure 2 presents a summary
of the preceding aspects and perspectives of Wireless
Network Virtualization.
In light of what has been presented, we can expect
the applications of wireless network virtualization to be
vast and certainly depend on particular interests asso-
ciated with solving specific problems and overcoming
precise challenges. For instance, we can find virtual-
ization mechanisms that focus on the virtualization of
infrastructure, others that focus on the virtualization of
the air-interface and others that focus on virtualizing
intermediate resources that facilitate a given goal.
Additionally, there are different characteristics of the
resources that virtualization exploits in order to achieve
the preceding aspects and perspectives. Nevertheless, the
flexibility to opt for dividing different flows, protocols
and spectrum resources is primordial for the existence of
wireless virtualization, and in fact, such a characteristic
is shared with spectrum sharing. It is for this reason that
in order to establish how wireless network virtualization
enables spectrum sharing, I would like to focus on this
particular attribute: flexibility.
In the following section, the notion of flexibility that
applies to this context is explained, and examples will
be presented from regulatory, technical and economic
perspectives.
IV. FLEXIBILITY
Flexibility is one important factor towards the real-
ization of spectrum sharing.6 In fact, we can infer how
flexibility is strongly tied to spectrum sharing from sec-
tion II, but we can also determine the strong correlation
that it holds with wireless spectrum virtualization from
section III. Flexibility could be explored more deeply in
the particular contexts of spectrum sharing and wireless
virtualization; nevertheless, the main objective of this
section is to shed some light on how we can leverage
the flexibility granted by wireless network virtualization
towards a more efficient realization of spectrum sharing
scenarios. Within this analysis, it is key to explore some
policy issues associated with flexibility, as well as the
economic implications of it.
A. Policy Perspective
From a regulatory perspective, in order to achieve
flexibility, licenses should be technology-neutral. This
would grant a license-holder not only the flexibility
to employ the technology that he sees fit, but also
to provide services he considers commercially viable
[8]. In this way, flexibility enables spectrum users to
make fundamental choices about how they will use the
spectrum (including whether to use it or to transfer their
usage rights to others) taking into account market factors
such as consumer demand, availability of technology
and competition [2]. Additionally, flexibility allows agile
licensees to put spectrum to its most valuable use with
the most effective technology, without being delayed
by regulatory processes (i.e., regulator’s authorization)
[38]. Furthermore, a flexible regulation can facilitate the
fluidity and dynamics of spectrum markets [39]. In the
most general terms, flexibility would allow users to make
use of spectrum in the way they wish.
It is important to note; however, that with flexible
regulation, the need to develop enforcement7 measures
that adapt to this flexibility arises. This renders the rights
to use the spectrum more practical [10] and may be a
source of certainty and incentives for the licensees.
In summary, regulatory flexibility implies that users
are not subject or tied to cumbersome regulatory require-
ments in order to access and use the spectrum. However,
they require an enforcement framework that provides
a given measure of assurance and certainty to enter
the sharing process. This can be considered as the first
step towards enabling spectrum sharing. Nevertheless,
there is the need of “technical” flexibility that could
6No claim is made that flexibility is the most or the only important
factor for achieving successful spectrum sharing scenarios. This factor
has been chosen due to its intrinsic relation with wireless network
virtualization and how it ties to regulatory and economic aspects, which
are relevant to the development of this work.
7Enforcement will not be deeply explored as it is out of the scope
of this paper.
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render the regulatory flexibility feasible and even more
advantageous.
B. Technology Perspective
From a technical perspective, flexibility can be ex-
plored through the lens of wireless network virtual-
ization. Network virtualization, in general, provides a
convenient means of sharing resources across a wide
set of users while allowing integration with other vir-
tualized substrates [37]. In fact, a fully-virtualized and
open infrastructure will not only allow to share the
infrastructure resources, but it will also make it possible
for different virtual instances (e.g., MVNOs) to deploy
different protocol stacks over the same radio resources.
Furthermore, with the advent of more sophisticated un-
derlying technologies (e.g., LTE-Advanced), flexibility
can be enhanced by taking basic radio resource blocks
as the fundamental units of virtualization. These virtu-
alized units can be further allocated via multiple access,
multiplexing and spectrum slicing techniques [33].
One of the foundations of wireless virtualization is
the decoupling of Service Providers’ functions from
those of Infrastructure Providers. This further allows
the decoupling of resources from services [40] and
makes virtualization processes take place in a given
layer independently from the other layers. For exam-
ple, the virtualization of resource blocks would take
place independently from the higher-layer architecture.
It should be further added that the flexibility (in addition
to isolation and granularity of control) over the wireless
infrastructure is enhanced as the depth of virtualization
is increased [33].
The characteristics above are extracted from particular
research works, which have focused on exploiting the
flexibility factor (explicitly or implicitly) in order to
make the spectrum resource available to a larger number
of users (i.e., to provide spectrum sharing opportunities).
For instance, an important research effort is the creation
of “resource pools” through the virtualization of different
network instances [41]–[44].
Some authors make an analogy of this pool of re-
sources to the cloud (as we normally refer in a computer
science context). The actual success of the notion of
clouds is derived from having the illusion of infinite
resources, which are available on demand, the elimi-
nation of high up-front commitments (thus costs) and
also the ability to pay for the resources on a short-term
basis, or as needed. In fact, the latter implies that users
who need spectrum can obtain it from different service
providers (i.e., the service providers that best support
their requirements) [31], [44].
In the particular context of spectrum, pooling is envi-
sioned to decrease scarcity. As contributions of spectrum
to the pool increase, lower is the probability that a given
user (with access to the pool) will experience spec-
trum shortage [45]. This increased spectral efficiency is
achieved given that spectrum pooling permits to overlay
a new radio system on an existing one without requiring
any changes to the licensed system currently in place
[42]. It should be pointed out that the benefits from spec-
trum pooling can be especially extracted in environments
where we find a great number of infrastructure providers
in the same geographical area (e.g., dense urban areas
with highly overlapping cellular networks) [40].
The aforementioned advantages constitute an impor-
tant basis for spectrum sharing; nevertheless, it is essen-
tial to explore how exactly spectrum pooling supports
the deployment of spectrum sharing. To fulfill this task,
I would like to point out two important approaches that
particularly benefit from the creation of spectrum pools:
(1) MVNOs and (2)Air-interface Virtualization.8
Wholesale networks are the closest example to a cloud
that currently exist. Mobile Virtual Network Operators
(MVNOs), in their simplest form, comprise the reselling
of cellular services purchased on a wholesale basis from
a Mobile Network Operator (MNO). An MVNO does not
incur in significant capital expenditure on spectrum and
infrastructure, and it is responsible for setting its own
retail prices. MVNOs could be set on a voluntary basis,
when MNOs resell their excess capacity after serving
their customers, or on a regulatory basis as a means
to increase competition and thus avoid monopolistic
behavior from existing MNOs.
The incorporation of resource pools can lead the way
to the provision of service-driven arrangements, which
could have an impact on the way MVNOs work. In fact,
MVNOs could opt to establish agreements with more
than one network operator. For example, an MVNO may
contract for low-latency services with one network and
high-quality indoor services with another. Additionally,
each service could have a different geographical scope
8These are not the only existing mechanisms; however, important
benefits relevant to spectrum sharing can be inferred from these
approaches.
(e.g., nationwide and coverage of dense urban environ-
ments, respectively) [43], [44].
The benefit that the MNOs could obtain from the
resource pool is that they have increased options for
reselling their excess spectrum besides MVNOs. In fact,
they could offer their resources to other cellular entities
and users taking the form of a band manager.
Taking one step further, the virtualization of the re-
sources within the pool is envisioned. This could lead the
way to the slicing of the resources pertaining to the pool,
which could later be aggregated into new configurations
thus offering more specialized services.
The evolution of new technologies such as LTE-
Advanced represent increased opportunities for the ap-
plication of wireless virtualization. For this reason, air-
interface virtualization will be analyzed in the context
of this technology. The goal of LTE air-interface virtual-
ization is to adapt the existing resources to the traffic
load variation of different virtual networks. For this
purpose, the virtualization of the eNodeB9 is proposed.
In this case, an entity called “hypervisor” is added on
top of the physical resources and it is in charge of
allocating them to the virtual instances that are running
atop. In this way, it is the hypervisor’s duty to allocate
the air-interface resources. In order to perform a proper
allocation, it needs to collect relevant information from
the individual virtual eNodeBs, such as channel condi-
tions, QoS requirements and information regarding the
service contract with each of the virtual operators. In
fact, the scheduling of resources can be performed in
terms of any of these factors, or additional ones such
as bandwidth, data rates, interference, among others.
The virtualization process happens when the hypervisor
converts these attributes into an appropriate number of
Physical Resource Blocks (PRBs) to assign to each
operator, making sure that there is an appropriate level of
fairness and that this allocation permits the users to fulfill
their requirements. Indeed, the scheduling of the PRBs
represents the splitting of the frequency band among the
eNodeBs of each operator [34], [46], [47].
A factor that can complement this process is the
possibility to perform carrier aggregation provided by
LTE-Advanced [48], [49]. In this manner, there are
further opportunities for spectrum to be assigned, and in
fact, this could lead to the creation of virtual bandwidth
units, which actually spread across multiple physical
bandwidth units (i.e., PRBs) [33]. The aggregation of
PRBs in such a way permits to translate this resource into
new ones, such as bandwidth or wireless capacity, which
can be further assigned to the different users, adding to
the level of transparency and flexibility that can improve
spectrum sharing.
9The enhanced NodeB is the part of the LTE infrastructure that is
in charge of sending/receiving data to/from the LTE users [34].
An interesting factor that can be inferred from these
applications of virtualization is the fact that they leave
room for the negotiation of resources. The utilization
of a scheduler (or hypervisor) has been mentioned;
nevertheless, market mechanisms (i.e., auctions) can also
be devised as effective mechanisms for resource assign-
ment [35], [50], [51]. When this approach is employed,
we can expect that the auction will be performed on
continuous goods, rather than discrete items. In other
words, spectrum requesters will be able to specify their
constraints and conditions and, more importantly utilize
the spectrum for more specialized services/requirements
they may have [31]. Additionally, the transparency that
springs from virtualization, may facilitate the achieve-
ment of liquidity requirements desired for markets suc-
cess [35].
Some specific models include the application of com-
binatorial auctions, which permit users to request re-
sources that comply with a set of particular charac-
teristics, thus obtaining a “package” that fulfills the
user requirements, instead of one particular, discrete,
item [31]. Other examples of spectrum markets have
been modeled through Stackelberg auctions via Agent-
based Computational Economics in order to assign the
virtualized resources to the users in (nearly) real-time
[35].
All of these examples show that through the applica-
tion of virtualization, the flexibility that spectrum shar-
ing requires is significantly enhanced, thus representing
promising and encouraging opportunities for a more
substantial deployment of spectrum sharing instances.
However, we shall remember that even when barriers to
spectrum sharing are removed, it is still important that
spectrum users have the appropriate incentives for shar-
ing. In particular, [45] points out that an important in-
centive for resource pooling is establishing “co-primary
rights”. Furthermore, Doyle et al. mention in [31] that a
key point is that successful collaborative consumption or
exclusive sharing schemes are not heavily biased towards
any particular user. Additional to these rights-related
factors, there are important underlying economic factors
that will drive the realization of the mechanisms above,
which are presented in the following subsection.
C. Economics Implications
From an Economics perspective, implementing flex-
ibility has its costs. Given that spectrum sharing can
result from the combination of various usage models in
different frequency bands (or the entire spectrum), the
same factors mentioned in subsection II-A for the choice
of spectrum usage models can be pointed out as drivers
for the choice of spectrum sharing mechanisms. These
factors are:
1) Spectrum scarcity
2) Transaction costs
Spectrum scarcity arises when the demand for spec-
trum is greater than the supply.
Regarding transaction costs, it is important to delve a
little bit deeper into the definitions and where they orig-
inate from. In a general sense, the costs of conducing an
activity, namely spectrum sharing, are called transaction
costs. They may be generated by diverse reasons. For
instance, transaction costs may be the result of laying
out the ground for spectrum sharing activities (in terms
of regulation and technology); they may be derived from
the time/efforts spent on negotiating in order to achieve
an agreement between the sharing parties, or they could
be even generated by enforcement and administrative
requirements [9], [52]. Note that transaction costs are
proportional to the number of entities participating in
the economic activity, in this case spectrum sharing [6].
Another important factor, source of additional costs
is externalities. Many economic activities generate in-
cidental benefits (external economies) or harm (external
diseconomies) to third parties for whom this benefit/harm
was not precisely intended. The total costs or benefits
caused by this activity do not match the cost incurred
or the benefit obtained by the entities performing the
activity in the first place [6], [52], [53]. Someone acting
on its individual self-interest, will not take into account
these externalities, unless compensated to do so. In fact,
the tragedy of the commons is an example of the dangers
that arise when people fail to take into account the
costs they impose on others [22], [52]. In this context,
transaction costs are the costs that a given user needs
to incur in order to compensate others for the unin-
tentional consequences of their activities (i.e., negotiate
with respect to externalities) and perhaps achieve an
internalization of the external costs.
Tying these concepts back to flexibility, it can be
asserted that, within a flexible spectrum rights scenario,
the negotiations to change the initial regulatory arrange-
ments of spectrum will take place if the possibility
of being able to make these modifications makes it
worthwhile to incur in the costs associated with them
[13]. Certainly, when transaction costs are high, only the
most beneficial types of negotiation are undertaken.
Within the spectrum sharing context, different types of
spectrum sharing options would be more appealing de-
pending on the level of scarcity and transaction costs. For
instance, scenarios where scarcity is high and transaction
costs associated to the market-based transfer of rights
are low can incentivize the assignment of exclusive-
use licenses that can later be transferred via market
transactions to other users and uses (e.g., real-time
secondary markets). On the other hand, scenarios where
scarcity is low and the transaction costs derived from
market mechanisms are high may favor the deployment
of commons configurations.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, when as-
sessing the feasibility of sharing mechanisms, it is also
important to take into account the “value” of spectrum in
the sharing environment and the efficiency in spectrum
use derived from the sharing process.
First of all, it is important to note that, economically
speaking, spectrum is not a store of value in itself;
instead, it is an input for the production of valued
services. In light of this, “the value of a given spectrum
license is limited by the profits that can be made with
its use, which are, in turn, limited by the profits from
alternative ways to provide the same service”. Profits
are evidently derived from revenues less investment and
operating costs incurred in deploying services with the
spectrum band. It follows that to the extent that the
profitability of spectrum-based services varies, the value
of the spectrum making these services possible will vary
as well [54].
In the particular context of spectrum sharing, there are
certain profit-reducing factors such as: restricting how a
single user would make use of a spectrum band under a
shared scheme in contrast to an exclusive license and
limiting the quality of the services offered. However,
sharing can also be less costly, when compared to fully
re purposing a band for other uses. It is in this manner
that when considering spectrum-sharing frameworks, it
is key to assess the foregone revenue of sharing in order
to understand the costs and benefits of a shared band.
For instance, a smaller scope of services will cause the
reduction of revenues, proportionally to the decrease in
service, as will any decrease in the quality of services
offered.
Regarding efficiency, a desired spectrum sharing op-
tion is the one that represents a more efficient alternative
for spectrum use. Taking into account that the total value
of a band of spectrum is the sum of the values for each
use of this band, a measure of efficiency and inefficiency
can be identified. Along these lines, “if the reduction
in value to each shared use is such that the sum of
these uses is less than the total value from a single
exclusive use, then sharing is inefficient.” Conversely, “if
the cumulative value from shared uses is greater than the
highest value to a single user, then sharing is efficient”
[54]. It should be added, that for increased efficiency, this
cumulative value should be higher than the transaction
costs.
To summarize what has been presented, it can be
concluded that 1) spectrum sharing should only be
implemented if the forgone value to the primary user
from sharing is less than the added value to secondary
user(s) and 2) spectrum sharing is efficient when the
cumulative value to all users is higher than the potential
value to a single user [54].
1) Incentives: The trade-offs that spectrum sharing
involves are tightly linked to the “value” of spectrum,
and consequently, they have an important impact on the
incentive for opening spectrum-sharing opportunities.
According to [55], adding flexibility to spectrum rights
has two opposing effects. In a first instance, added
flexibility gives users the opportunity to optimize their
services with fewer constraints, which in turn increases
the value of the spectrum license. However, at a second
instance, flexibility may allow entry of new users and
thus increase competition, factor that will result in the
reduction of value of those same licenses. In light of this,
given a spectrum sharing arrangement, existing licensees
will have little or no incentive to share their excess or
unused spectrum if the new users will provide the same
service that is currently provided by them. An option
that would incentivize licensees to share or trade their
spectrum would be if they were able to establish enough
restrictions so as to protect their current services, not
only in terms of physical requirements (e.g., interference,
QoS) but also in terms of competition. In absence of
this possibility (and when sharing is the chosen arrange-
ment), licensees need to find different alternatives to
remain competitive in the market such as the introduction
of value-differentiated services and innovation. Existing
MNOs will also find motivation for sharing if this
represents substantial savings in operational expenditures
and if they can experience capacity and coverage gains
from an efficient pooling of resources [56].
From the new spectrum users perspective (e.g., new op-
erators or market entrants), spectrum sharing represents
important opportunities to access spectrum as it will,
most likely, become less expensive.10 From the end users
perspective, service prices may be driven down due to
competition in data communication services.
The particular case of licensees who do not pay
for spectrum access (e.g., spectrum for Federal use)
should be mentioned. Generally, these licensees do not
have enough incentives to properly represent their actual
spectrum needs and requirements [57]. In fact, until these
users internalize the costs inherent to their spectrum use,
they will not have the incentive to find more efficient
uses of their spectrum or maximize the social value of
this resource [54].
Uncertainty is another essential factor when we ex-
plore incentives. In fact, spectrum sharing potentially
increases uncertainty about the profitability of a project.
This uncertainty is mainly associated with the availabil-
ity of spectrum and how harmful will the interference
10We are focusing on the spectrum aspect of sharing and virtual-
ization, this is why the decrease in cost of access to this resource is
mentioned. It is evident that sharing other network instances repre-
sents significant benefits in terms of lowering capital and operational
expenditures, not to mention the avoidance of high sunk costs.
caused by the new spectrum users be [54]. Other key
factors include the time that users can access the spec-
trum for. As a matter of fact, when the rights to use
the spectrum are granted for a short period, efficient
opportunities for sharing may be deterred [15]. The
shorter the period available to recover the costs and
investments incurred, the greater the aversion for users
to enter in such a negotiation [15].
In this light, an important factor associated with the
provision of incentives and reduction of uncertainty is
the definition of appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
Indeed, users are willing to incur in enforcement-related
costs, which are proportional to the value of the resource
they are “protecting” [58]. In this way, through an
appropriate definition of enforcement mechanisms, the
incentives of users for sharing may rise, as there are
better defined notions of rights and accountability to
support the sharing process.
It can be inferred that spectrum sharing, virtualization
and the flexibility derived from them lay a dark shadow
over networks centered around a single license holder.
Instead, light is shed over networks formed by various
entities (some of them virtual) sharing the underlying
resources. It is in this way that in order to address
properly all the changes generated by spectrum sharing
and the resulting changes in the value of spectrum,
different entities are prompted to better understand where
the value is generated in the network and how it is
created, which might be the responses from other net-
work participants and how the activities of the entities
themselves affect the network [59].
In Figure 3, some important remarks regarding the
policy, technology and economics perspectives of flex-
ibility are highlighted, in addition to the benefits that
stem from them.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
The analysis made in this work suggests that there
is a lot of room for wireless network virtualization to
exploit flexibility and thus enable spectrum sharing. In
fact, wireless virtualization does not only make spectrum
sharing possible, but it is also enhanced by it. For
instance, it is spectrum sharing that renders spectrum
efficiency and some levels of increased capacity possible
in virtualized environments.
In all these scenarios; however, an important consid-
eration to make is that for innovation to be successful, it
needs to take into account the entire system. By system
I mean the wireless technology, spectrum policy and the
economics behind them.
Regarding policy and economics, there is no complete
independence of the economic and legal systems. Law
can be designed in such a way that certain desirable
transactions may be impossible to achieve. For example,
regulation may impose costly and time-consuming pro-
cedures that can cause market failure or deter otherwise
appealing sharing arrangements. These costly procedures
can stem from laying out the initial regulatory require-
ments for spectrum sharing, or they can also be linked to
deploying adequate enforcement mechanisms. It is in this
way that a flexible definition of rights constitutes only the
starting point for the rearrangement of these rights via
more appealing mechanisms [13] (e.g., spectrum sharing
and virtualization).
In terms of technology and policy, no significant ad-
vancement will be successful and have practical value if
there is no policy approach rendering it feasible. In other
words, new technologies can alleviate spectrum scarcity,
if and only if, spectrum policy is reformed to match
the technology. It would be thus essential to achieve a
regulatory framework that could foster the technological
advances that portray spectrum sharing as a promising
solution for the evident constraints originated by the
current and upcoming spectrum requirements.
From the virtualization standpoint, the choice of re-
sources and functionalities that are partitioned and sliced
may affect the flexibility of the whole implementation,
thus posing restrictions for the subsequent spectrum
sharing schemes. Additionally, it is important to note that
particular wireless standards have specific requirements
that represent challenges at the time of incorporating
them to a given virtualization layer. This can impose
further constraints when envisioning heterogeneous net-
works that deal with different wireless technologies, and,
evidently, are expected to address diverse purposes. In
other words, towards the efforts of working seamlessly
with distinct technologies, particular characteristics of
one or other technology may be lost or degraded [33].
On top of this constraints, it is key to remember that for
a virtual network to be successful, it needs to provide
the proper isolation among the virtual instances created.
New technologies, such as LTE-A, offer significant op-
portunities which may lay the ground for overcoming
some of the aforementioned constraints.
Finally, even if the increased spectrum demands repre-
sent an important driver for virtualization and spectrum
sharing, users, operators and regulators need incentives
in order to adopt changes. Incentives, and the lack
thereof, for the adoption of spectrum sharing have been
presented in this work; however, there will still not be
a clear answer unless the value of the sharing outcome,
as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain such
result, are known with some certitude [14].
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